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1Determinants of ﬁnancial conservatism: Evidence from
low-leverage and cash-rich UK ﬁrms.
Abstract
This paper investigates the characteristics of ﬁrms that
adopt persistent policies of low leverage and substantial cash
reserves. In doing so, speciﬁca t t e n t i o ni sp a i dt ot h er o l e
of internal corporate governance mechanisms in inﬂuencing
ﬁrms’ conservative ﬁnancial policies. The analysis of this pa-
per classiﬁes ﬁrms as ﬁnancially conservative if they adopt
both low-leverage and high-cash policies at the same time.
Using a large sample of non-ﬁnancial UK ﬁrms over the pe-
riod 1984-2001, we provide evidence that conservative ﬁrms
tend to undershoot (overshoot) their target leverage (cash
holdings) levels. Our results also suggest that managerial
ownership, board composition and, to some extent, ownership
concentration are important determinants of the probability
of ﬁrms adopting conservative ﬁnancial policies.
21 Introduction
It is suggested that ﬁrms normally desire to have ﬁnancial ﬂexibility in
ﬁnancing investments in order to avoid excessive costs of raising funds
externally (see, e.g., Myers, 1984; and Myers and Majluf, 1984). In ad-
dition, ﬂexibility is more valuable for ﬁrms with greater growth opportu-
nities and those that are associated with severe information asymmetries
and greater ﬁnancial distress risk. It is also recognised that ﬁnancial
ﬂexibility can be achieved through conservative ﬁnancial policies. That
is, ﬁrms may choose to hold substantial cash reserves and/or have spare
debt capacity as a buﬀer against possible future ﬁnancial constraints
which would prevent them from taking up valuable investment opportu-
nities.
There has been a great deal of empirical work that studies ﬁrms with
substantial cash balances. This strand of literature revolves around the
questions of why some ﬁr m sh o l da m p l ec a s ha n dc a s he q u i v a l e n t s( s e e ,
e.g., Kim et al., 1998; Opler et al., 1999; and Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004)
and what the consequences of such policies are (Mikkelson and Partch,
2003). However, much less empirical work has been done on ﬁrms that
adopt policies of low leverage, with notable exception of Minton and
Wruck (2001). More importantly, thus far, there has been no attempt
to investigate the coexistence of these two policies and the way in which
they work to shape ﬁrms’ ﬁnancially conservative policies. The existing
studies use either cash holdings (Mikkelson and Partch, 2003) or lever-
age (Minton and Wruck, 2001) of ﬁrms to decide whether ﬁrms can be
classiﬁed as ﬁnancially-conservative.
3The main objective of this paper is, therefore, to identify a sample of
ﬁrms that best captures the behaviour of ﬁnancially conservative ﬁrms
and to analyse the empirical determinants of ﬁnancially conservative poli-
cies. In doing so, it contributes to the literature on ﬁnancial conservatism
on two major grounds.
Our ﬁrst major contribution lies in the approach we adopt in iden-
tifying ﬁnancially-conservative ﬁrms. It has several important aspects
that make, we believe, our analysis a more satisfactory basis to study
conservative ﬁrms. First, as opposed to the existing studies that choose
ﬁxed threshold levels of cash holdings and leverage, we use a discrimi-
nant analysis based on the non-parametric estimate of the distribution of
cash holdings and leverage to identify ﬁnancially conservative ﬁrms. This
allows us to estimate the appropriate cut-oﬀ points without imposing a
priori arbitrary threshold levels. We carry out this analysis for each year
throughout the sample period 1984-2001 in order to allow these cut-oﬀ
points to vary over time.
Second, in identifying a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial status, we combine both as-
pects of ﬁnancial conservatism, namely leverage-conservatism and cash-
conservatism. We argue that, to the extent that leverage and cash holding
policies of ﬁrms are interdependent, investigating these two policies sepa-
rately can lead to misleading conclusions. As noted earlier, the ﬂexibility
in ﬁnancing investments can be attained either through substantial cash
holdings or spare debt capacity. It is then hard to explain why ﬁrms
should not have both forms of conservatism in place as complementary
policies, rather than treating them as substitutes, which seems to be the
4implicit assumption of the prior research on ﬁnancial conservatism. It
is, for example, possible that low-leverage ﬁrms can also hold large cash
balances when they have suﬃcient growth opportunities.
Moreover, it is argued that ﬁnancially constrained ﬁr m sh a v em o r e
incentives to hold large cash reserves (Hovakimian and Titman, 2003;
Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1996; and Kim et al., 1998). Then, to
the extent that substantial cash holdings point to current - or expected fu-
ture - ﬁnancial constraints, ﬁrms with large cash balances are more likely
to be restricted in the access to external ﬁnance and hence follow low-
leverage policies.1 That is, these ﬁrms may adopt leverage-conservative
policies due to precautionary motives against ﬁnancial constraints. An-
other reason for the coexistence of cash and leverage-conservative policies
is that managers may have incentives to stockpile cash in order to avoid
the use of debt ﬁnancing. Taken together, these arguments possibly point
t oas i g n i ﬁcant interaction between ﬁrms’ cash holdings and leverage to
determine their conservative ﬁnancial policies. As a result, in an attempt
to take a closer look at what constitutes a ﬁnancially-conservative ﬁrm,
we investigate cash and leverage policies both in isolation and jointly.
Last but not least on our classiﬁcation approach, we investigate whether
ﬁrms that are likely to be conservative also deviate from their optimal
behaviour persistently.2 We do so by estimating target levels of leverage
1However, others suggest that ﬁrms with large cash balances are not constrained
since their investment is not limited by a lack of ﬁnance (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997;
and Kashyap, Lamont and Stein, 1994). The implication in this case would be that
cash-conservatism and leverage-conservatism act as substitutes.
2Prior work that provides evidence that ﬁrms in general behave as though they
5and cash holdings and comparing them with the observed ones. This
is to avoid the circumstances in which, for example, a ﬁrm is classiﬁed
as leverage-conservative (cash-conservative), because its leverage (cash
holdings) ratio is lower (higher) than the cut-oﬀ level of leverage (cash
holdings) determined by the discriminant analysis, but its observed level
of leverage (cash reserves) is higher (lower) than the target one.3
Our second major contribution in this paper concerns itself with the
empirical investigation of the impact of the internal corporate governance
mechanisms - such as the equity ownership structure of ﬁrms and the
board of directors - on ﬁnancial conservatism. Prior research provides
support for the signiﬁcant inﬂuence of various governance characteristics
on ﬁrms’ leverage and cash holdings decisions (see, e.g., Berger, Ofek and
Yemarck, 1997 and Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004). However, to the best of
our knowledge, the importance of the internal governance mechanisms in
determining ﬁnancial conservatism has not been analysed. We attempt
to do so by incorporating a unique set of information on managerial
ownership, board structure and ownership concentration in the analysis
f o ral a r g es a m p l eo fU Kﬁrms over time.
The arguments so far suggest that conservative ﬁnancial policies may
have target levels of leverage and cash holdings includes Opler et al. (1999) and
Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999).
3We recognise that target leverage of a ﬁrm may diﬀer from its debt capacity and
spare debt capacity may be more appropriate in considering leverage-conservatism.
However, given that it is diﬃcult to estimate the ﬁrm’s debt capacity, we assume
that the deviation of target debt level from debt capacity is negligible (or constant).
Accordingly, we consider target levels of debt in comparing them with the observed
ones.
6serve shareholders’ interests through lower costs of investment ﬁnanc-
ing. It can also be argued that conservative policies may serve managers’
interests. For example, managers may have incentives to follow a con-
servative cash policy to increase the amount of liquid assets under their
control to pursue their own objectives at the expense of those of share-
holders (Jensen, 1986). Moreover, the extent to which leverage puts
disciplinary pressures on managers, a persistent policy of low leverage
may be pursued by managers in an attempt to reduce such pressure.
We argue that the extent to which higher levels of managerial owner-
ship lead to a greater degree of managerial discretion and cash holdings
mainly serve managers’ interests, the likelihood of cash-conservatism will
increase with managerial ownership. Alternatively, to the extent that
leverage exerts disciplinary pressure on managers and greater manage-
rial shareholdings in the ﬁrm make managers more risk-averse regarding
the risk of bankruptcy, managerial ownership should increase the likeli-
hood of leverage-conservatism. Consequently, ﬁnancial slack reduces or
eliminates discipline provided through raising external ﬁnancing.
In testing these hypotheses we distinguish between executive and non-
executive shareholdings. This is due to the argument that non-executive
directors are normally expected to perform a monitoring and disciplining
function over executive directors. This would, in turn, suggest that the ef-
fective presence of non-executive directors may aﬀect ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial poli-
cies. For example, one can argue that ﬁrms with stronger non-executive
directors are less likely to adopt conservative ﬁnancial policies because
of the expected reduction in the cost of external ﬁnance due to more ef-
7ﬁcient monitoring and disciplining exercised by non-executive managers.
To analyse the inﬂuence of non-executive directors on ﬁrms’ conservative
policies, we include in the empirical analysis both non-executive owner-
ship and ﬁrms’ board composition, given by the ratio of non-executive
directors on the board.
We incorporate in our analysis the view that in the presence of large
shareholders managerial discretion is curbed and agency costs between
managers and shareholders are reduced (Stiglitz, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny,
1 9 8 6 ) . T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h i sa r g u m e n th o l d s ,t h ec o s to fe x t e r n a lﬁ-
nancing would be lower for ﬁrms with large shareholders, implying less
need to hold substantial cash balances and a desire to have spare debt
capacity. However, it is recognised that there may be private beneﬁts of
control accruing to large shareholders, not necessarily shared by minor-
ity shareholders. Consequently, large shareholders might have incentives
to increase the amounts of funds under their control to consume private
beneﬁts at the expense of minority shareholders. This, in turn, suggests
that ﬁrms with greater ownership concentration are more likely to be at
least cash-conservative.
We have a set of interesting results. Our ﬁndings reveal that ﬁrms
having ﬁnancially-conservative policies also tend to be persistently oﬀ-
target with regard to both leverage and cash holdings decisions. They
persistently hold larger than target-cash balances and lower than target-
levels of debt than predicted by theories of capital structure. Moreover,
the probability of adopting a conservative policy is aﬀected by the ﬁrm’s
ownership structure. Our results suggest that cash conservative policies
8are positively associated with ownership concentration and the sharehold-
ings by executive directors. Moreover, we ﬁnd that leverage-conservatism
is negatively correlated with the fraction of shares held by non-executive
directors. Finally, the probability of adopting a ﬁnancially-conservative
policy decreases as the percentage of non-executive directors in the board
increases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the
interaction between the ownership structure of companies and conserva-
tive ﬁnancial policies. In section 3, we describe our methodology and
the data. Section 4 presents our empirical results. Finally, section 5
concludes.
2 Conservatism and ownership structure
In this section, we discuss the ways in which the ownership structure of
companies may shape the conservative ﬁnancial policies ﬁrms adopt. We
mainly focus on the role of executive and non-executive shareholdings
a n do nw h e t h e ro w n e r s h i pc o n c e n t r a t i o nc a ni n ﬂuence the incentives of
ﬁrms to adopt ﬁnancially-conservative policies. In addition, we discuss
the relationship that may exist between board composition and ﬁnancial
conservatism.
The conﬂicts of interest between managers and shareholders have
been well-documented in the corporate ﬁnance literature. One of the
main conﬂicts relates to the ﬁrm’s cash holdings. Jensen (1986) argues
that managers can have incentives to hold large amounts of cash to pursue
9their own objectives at the expense of those of shareholders. They can,
for example, squander funds by consuming perquisites and/or making
ineﬃcient investment decisions (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Moreover,
it is worth noting that greater cash holdings serve managers’ interests
by possibly providing protection against disciplining pressure exerted by
external investors.
In addition, it has been argued that managerial ownership can help
align the interests of managers with those of shareholders. That is, with
increased managerial ownership, managers are less likely to divert re-
sources away from value maximisation as they bear part of the costs re-
sulting from their actions. To the extent that the alignment of interests
is achieved, the ﬁrm’s ability to raise external ﬁnance should improve
with increased managerial holdings, implying less need to accumulate
cash and to have spare debt capacity. This argument suggests a nega-
tive inﬂuence exerted by managerial ownership on the likelihood of ﬁrms
adopting conservative ﬁnancial policies.
However, it is also possible that greater ownership gives managers
more direct control over the ﬁrm, increasing their ability to resist outside
disciplinary pressures. Consequently, entrenched managers who are rel-
atively free of external discipline would choose to accumulate more cash
and to have lower leverage to pursue their own interests without risking
replacement. The net impact of these two eﬀects would determine the
sign of the eﬀect of managerial ownership on the likelihood that the ﬁrm
will adopt ﬁnancially-conservative policies.
One increasingly important issue relating to the agency conﬂicts be-
10tween managers and shareholders concerns the role of board composition
in inﬂuencing managerial incentives (see, Hermalin and Weisbach, 2002
for an extensive survey). It is argued that non-executive directors are
appointed to act in shareholders’ interests (Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997;
and Mayers et al., 1997) and they can perform a signiﬁcant monitoring
and disciplining function over executive directors.4 T ot h ee x t e n tt h a t
these arguments hold, the interests of managers and shareholders are
likely to be aligned better in boards with greater representation of non-
executive directors than those dominated by executive directors.5 That
is, managers’ incentives to hold substantial cash balances would be re-
duced and the cost of external ﬁnancing would fall, making ﬁrms less
likely to adopt ﬁnancially-conservative policies.
It is suggested that another way of alleviating the agency problem
between managers and shareholders is for shareholders to monitor man-
agers to ensure that they act in the interests of shareholders. However,
for an average shareholder there may be little or no incentive to moni-
tor managers as the cost of monitoring is likely to outweigh the beneﬁt.
In contrast, large shareholders, having claims on a large fraction of the
ﬁrm’s cash ﬂows, can have more incentives to monitor and can do so
more eﬀectively. Consequently, in the presence of a large shareholder,
managerial discretion can be curbed and agency costs between managers
4Fama and Jensen (1983) suggest that they have incentives to signal that they
indeed act in that way.
5There is some empirical evidence supporting these predictions that the market
reacts more positively to decisions taken by outsider-dominated ﬁrms than those taken
by insider-dominated ﬁrms (see Borokhovich et al., 1996 for an extensive discussion).
11and shareholders are reduced (Stiglitz, 1985; Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
T ot h ee x t e n tt h a tt h e s ea r g u m e n t sh o l d ,t h ec o s to fe x t e r n a lﬁnancing
would be lower for ﬁrms with large shareholders, implying less need to
hold higher (lower) levels of cash (debt).
While enhanced monitoring by large shareholders can help reduce
some of the agency problems associated with management, there are also
private beneﬁts of control accruing to large shareholders, not necessarily
shared by minority shareholders (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Faccio et
al., 2001; and Holderness, 2002). Consequently, large shareholders might
have incentives to increase the amounts of funds under their control to
consume private beneﬁts at the expense of minority shareholders. This,
in turn, suggests that ﬁrms with large shareholders are more likely to be
at least cash-conservative and possibly also leverage-conservative due to
an increase in the cost of external ﬁnancing.
3 Methodology and the data
3.1 Classiﬁcation of ﬁnancially-conservative ﬁrms
As mentioned earlier, the deﬁnition of ﬁnancial conservatism across al-
ternative studies varies depending on the variable used in classifying
ﬁnancially-conservative ﬁrms. Prior research considers ﬁxed classiﬁcation
rules using either leverage or cash holdings of ﬁrms. For example, Mikkel-
son and Partch (2003) deﬁne a ﬁrm as being ﬁnancially-conservative if it
holds large cash holdings persistently, i.e. if it holds more than 25 per-
cent of its assets in cash and cash equivalents for ﬁve years. On the other
12hand, Minton and Wruck (2001) deﬁne a ﬁrm as ﬁnancially-conservative
if it adopts a low leverage policy persistently, i.e. if its annual ratio of
total debt to total assets belongs to the ﬁrst 20 percent of all ﬁrms for
ﬁve consecutive years.
In our analysis we consider both leverage-conservatism and cash-
conservatism. We argue that one should investigate these two policies
jointly to account for the possibility that ﬁr m sc a nu s el e v e r a g ea n dc a s h
holdings as substitutes. As we argued earlier, the main motive for ﬁrms
to choose conservative ﬁnancial policies is the precautionary motive that
places much emphasis on the costs arising from the foregone investment
opportunities. The literature implies that this can be achieved either
through substantial cash balances or spare debt capacity. Clearly, it is
possible that ﬁrms may have both forms of conservatism at the same
t i m ea n di ti sn o to b v i o u sw h yt h e ys h o u l dn o td os o .H o w e v e r ,i tw o u l d
be inconsistent with the main theoretical capital structure explanations
to observe cash-conservative ﬁrms having high leverage in their capital
structures. The pecking order theory, for example, predicts that ﬁrms
should ﬁrst exhaust internally available funds and then resort to more
expensive external debt and equity ﬁnancing.
It is also diﬃcult to explain why a ﬁrm that is classiﬁed as leverage-
conservative should not be expected to hold large cash balances when it
has, for example, suﬃcient growth opportunities. We suggest that these
possibilities should be controlled for in identifying ﬁr m st h a ta r es a i dt o
have conservative ﬁnancial policies.
In an attempt to successfully deal with these concerns, we determine
13three categories of ﬁrms by using cash holdings and leverage levels of
ﬁrms, namely, cash-conservative, leverage-conservative and ﬁnancially-
conservative ﬁrms that are conservative with respect to both cash and
leverage decisions. For a ﬁrm to be classiﬁed into one of these categories
we impose that ﬁrms must display the required characteristics for at least
three consecutive years. For our sample period over 1984-2001, illustrated
in Figure 1, this leads to six non-overlapping three-year panels, where
each panel will be treated as an observation in the subsequent analysis.6
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
The drawbacks of the ﬁxed classiﬁcation rules and the advantages of
adopting an approach similar to the one used in this paper may now
be clearer. First, we argue that they are discretionary in the sense that
it is diﬃcult to explain why, for example, the 25 percent rule for cash
holdings is appropriate in classifying cash-conservative ﬁrms. Instead,
as explained below in detail, we allow the distribution of the relevant
variable to determine the so-called cut-oﬀ level. Second, the approach
using a ﬁxed classiﬁcation rule does not account for the evolution of the
distributions of leverage and cash holdings over time. We allow for the
6Obviously, using a three-year deﬁnition reduces our sample size relative to a one-
year deﬁnition adopted, for example, in Fama and French (1999) and Graham (2000).
However, there are obvious beneﬁts of not using a one-year deﬁnition. For example,
our sample is less likely to be subject to problems generated by mean reversion.
Moreover, a single year deﬁnition would be clearly unable to distinguish between
transitory and persistent conservative policies.
14possibility that the cut-oﬀ points, which split the ﬁrms into two groups,
to change over time simply because the distributions of these variables
may change in the long-run.
Finally, the existing studies do not account for diﬀerences in target
levels of cash holdings and leverage across ﬁrms. As we discussed earlier,
it is not suﬃcient only to observe that ﬁrms have historically low levels
of debt and/or hold large amounts of cash and equivalents. It is also
essential to know whether ﬁrms’ observed behaviour is diﬀerent from
their target one. This would enable us to avoid the circumstances in
which, for example, a ﬁrm is classiﬁed as leverage-conservative because
its leverage ratio is lower than the cut-oﬀ leverage level but its observed
leverage is higher than the target one.7
3.2 Methodology
To examine the empirical determinants of ﬁnancial conservatism, we start
by an analysis to identify ﬁnancially-conservative ﬁrms. We carry out
our classiﬁcation analysis as follows. First, we use a discriminant analysis
based on the non-parametric estimates of the distribution of leverage and
cash holdings (see Silverman, 1981 and Bianchi, 1997).8 More speciﬁcally,
7It can be argued that that persistently low levels of debt may be a proxy for
ﬁrms’ low debt capacity and hence these ﬁrms may run into ﬁnancial constraints
more quickly. Our analysis allows us to distinguish between these ﬁrms and ﬁnancially
conservative ones that optimally choose to maintain some precautionay spare debt.
8Since we are interested in studying the shape of the density function, we do not
impose any particular shape to the density to be estimated, and we adopt a fully
non-parametric approach.
15we estimate T densities of leverage and T densities of cash balances for
each year from 1984 to 2001 to account for changes over time of the
p o i n ta tw h i c ht h es a m p l ei ss p l i t . W ed e ﬁne a ﬁrm in a particular
year as leverage-conservative if its leverage ratio is lower than the ﬁrst
interior minimum in the leverage distribution for that year. Similarly, in a
particular year a ﬁrm is classiﬁed as cash-conservative if its cash-holdings
ratio is greater than the last interior minimum in the distribution of cash
balances. To capture persistency, ﬁrms are required to remain in the
same panel for three consecutive years. Finally, a ﬁrm is classiﬁed as
being ﬁnancially-conservative if it is both leverage and cash conservative
i nt h es a m ep a n e l .
As we mentioned earlier, we also investigate if ﬁrms that are initially
classiﬁed as conservative in the ﬁrst round are also persistently oﬀ-target
with regard to the levels of leverage and cash holdings. For this purpose,
we estimate target levels of cash holdings and leverage for each of the six
panels and examine whether ﬁrms persistently deviate from these targets
within each panel. This classiﬁcation allows us to examine the ﬁnancial
policies of ﬁrms that are both cash and leverage conservative and, at the
same time, are away from their target behaviour in a particular way, i.e.
overshoot their target cash holdings and undershoot their target debt
levels.9
The model we use to estimate target levels of cash holdings and lever-
9These criteria to identify conservative ﬁrms are obviously stricter than those used
in the previous literature and, as displayed later, lead to a smaller number of ﬁrms
classiﬁed as ﬁnancially-conservative.
16age are borrowed from the existing literature on cash holdings and capital
structure (see, e.g., Opler et al., 1999 and Ozkan and Ozkan, 2004 for
cash holdings; and Rajan and Zingales, 1995 for capital structure). In
particular, the model we use to estimate optimal level of cash holdings
for each panel takes the form of
CASHi = β0 + β1CFLOWi + β2LIQi + β3LEVi+
+β4MTBi + β5CAPEXi + β6SIZEi + εi
(1)
where CASH stands for the ratio of holdings of cash and cash equivalents
to total assets; CFLOW is the ratio of pre-tax proﬁts plus depreciation
to total assets; LIQ is the ratio of current assets minus current liabilities
and total cash to total assets; LEV is the ratio of total debt to total
assets; CAPEX stands for the ratio of capital expenditures to total
assets; MTB is the ratio of book value of total assets minus the book
value of equity plus the market value of equity to book value of assets; and
SIZE is the logarithm of total assets in constant prices. The leverage
model we estimate is
LEVi = α0 + α1FIXASTi + α2MTBi + α3CASHi+
+α4PROFIT i + α5SIZEi + ωi
(2)
where FIXAST denotes the ratio of tangible assets to total assets and
PROFIT denotes the ratio of earnings before interest payments and tax
to total assets.10
In estimating both cross-sectional models, each panel is treated as one
cross-sectional observation, where we use the average values of each of the
10Both model (1) and (2) are industry adjusted.
17ﬁrm characteristics over the two years preceeding the ﬁnal year in each
panel. We measure leverage and cash holdings (the dependent variables)
in the ﬁnal year. This is done in an attempt to mitigate problems that
might arise due to short-term ﬂuctuations or extreme values in one year.
Moreover, this approach to some extent controls for the problem of en-
dogeneity. Using past values reduces the likelihood of observed relations
reﬂecting the eﬀects of leverage and cash holdings on other ﬁrm-speciﬁc
factors (see Rajan and Zingales, 1995 for a similar approach).
The estimated parameters from models (1) and (2) are then used to
calculate the target levels of leverage LEV ∗
p and cash holdings CASH∗
p for
each ﬁrm in each year. We next use these values to calculate deviations
of the observed leverage and cash holdings of ﬁrms, DLEV and DCASH










where ﬁrms are represented by subscript i,t i m eb yt, and non-overlapping
panels by p =1 ...6. This enables us to identify ﬁrms that are cash and/or
leverage conservative and that deviate from their targets in a particular
way. For example, by doing so, one would be able to identify those ﬁrms
that are cash-conservative according to the distribution criterion and for
which DCASHi > 0 for all years in a panel. Similarly, the same classiﬁ-
cation for leverage leads to the identiﬁcation of ﬁrms that are leverage-
conservative and DLEVi < 0 for all years in a panel. Finally, we are also
able to identify ﬁrms that are both cash and leverage-conservative and for
which DLEVi < 0 and DCASHi > 0 f o re a c hy e a ri nap a n e l .F o rc o m -
parison purposes we also use the criteria adopted in Minton and Wruck
18(2001) and Mikkelson and Partch (2003) to identify leverage-conservative,
cash conservative and ﬁnancially-conservative ﬁrms.
Consequently, we create the following nine dummy variables, under-





1 if a ﬁrm belongs to a conservative group
0 otherwise
for J =1 ,...,9
(4)
We use these dummy variables as dependent variables in our logistic
regression models in Section 4.3 to empirically investigate the determi-
nants of the probability of adopting a leverage, cash or a ﬁnancially-
conservative policy.
3.3 The data
Our sample of ﬁrms is taken from Datastream and includes includes
an unbalanced panel of publicly traded UK ﬁrms for the years 1984 to
2001.We exclude ﬁnancial ﬁrms from the sample. We also exclude missing
ﬁrm-year observations for any variable in the model during the sample
period. Finally, from these ﬁrms, we choose only those with at least six
continuous time series observations. These criteria provide us with 1,196
ﬁrms and 14,317 ﬁrm-year observations.
In addition to the variables discussed above, we include several other
variables to describe corporate ownership structure. We employ the frac-
tion of shares held by executive directors, the fraction of shares held by
non-executive directors, and the number of non-executive directors in the
board as a percentage of all directors to describe the board composition.
19Finally, we use the fraction of shares held by major shareholders as a
proxy for ownership concentration. Ownership data were collected from
several editions (1995, 1997, 1999 and 2001) of the Price Waterhouse
Corporate Register. Managerial ownership data consist of beneﬁcial as
well as non-beneﬁcial directors’ holdings, in which the latter refers to
holdings by directors on behalf of their families and charitable trusts.
Although managers do not obtain beneﬁts from these holdings directly,
they usually have control rights. Obviously, we are able to incorporate
ownership information only in panels D, E and F in Figure 1 and hence
use only these three panels in the empirical analysis.
4 Empirical results
4.1 Classiﬁcation results
We present in Figure 2 four examples with regard to the discriminant
analysis based on the estimated distributions of leverage and cash hold-
ings, which were obtained using a Gaussian Kernel and a Least-Squares
Cross-Validation bandwidth (Silverman 1981). Panel A shows the es-
timate of the leverage distribution for 1999. The solid line represents
the cut-oﬀ points for leverage, where ﬁrms whose leverage is located to
t h el e f to ft h i sp o i n ta r ed e ﬁned as leverage-conservative for this year.
For comparison purposes, the dotted line represents the splitting point
resulting from the ﬁxed classiﬁcation rule, i.e. the bottom 20 percent of
all ﬁrms. In Panel B we present the results for 1989 to note that the
two alternative criteria of conservatism may lead to similar results as in
20Panel A or rather diﬀerent ones as in Panel B. We carry out a similar
exercise for cash holdings in Panels C and D. As can be seen from Panel
C, our criterion, represented by the solid line, identiﬁes a cut-oﬀ level of
cash holdings, which points to a lower level of cash holdings above which
ﬁrms are classiﬁed as cash-conservative. Furthermore, Panel D reveals
that our criterion may suggest a splitting point that is signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from that suggested by a ﬁxed cash holdings to total assets ratio
of 25 percent.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
Table 1 reports the total number of ﬁr m - y e a ro b s e r v a t i o n sw eh a v ef o r
each year and results arising from the alternative classiﬁcation schemes
we employ. For example, consider 1992 for which we have a total number
of 920 ﬁrm-year observations. Of these, 184 are leverage-conservative
according to the ﬁxed classiﬁcation rule of 20 percent, criterion suggested
by Minton and Wruck (2001); 100 are cash conservative according to the
ﬁxed classiﬁcation rule of 25 percent, criterion adopted in Mikkelson and
Partch (2002); and 52 ﬁrms satisfy both ﬁxed classiﬁcation rule criteria.
According to the discriminant-based analysis, however, they are recorded
as 135 (LEV), 129 (CASH) and 54 (CONS) respectively. In this case, our
criterion on leverage is stricter than the 20 percent rule and less strict
than the 25 percent rule. However, it should be noted that a diﬀerent
pattern may emerge across diﬀerent years as, for example, in 1988.
21INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
From this table we generate the panels we use in the subsequent
analysis. As shown in Table 2 we have six non-overlapping panels.11 As
expected, the results reveal that our classiﬁcation criterion leads to diﬀer-
ent results in each panel than those resulting from the ﬁxed classiﬁcation
rule approach. As far as leverage-conservatism is concerned, our ﬁndings
are similar to those obtained following the 20 percent rule. We are able to
classify 475 ﬁrms as leverage-conservative across all panels as opposed to
484 ﬁrms we would classify under the 20 percent criterion. However, our
results for cash-conservatism are less consistent with those implied by the
25 percent criterion adopted in Mikkelson and Partch (2002). The results
suggest that the 25 percent criterion is too restrictive in the sense that
across all panels our approach classiﬁes more ﬁr m sa sc a s h - c o n s e r v a t i v e ,
i.e. 375 as opposed to 271 ﬁrms. We also observe that 181 ﬁrms are
both cash and leverage-conservative, shown under the column CONS,
and hence are classiﬁed as ﬁnancially-conservative. The number that we
arrived using the ﬁxed classiﬁcation rule is 149.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
11Note that the number of ﬁrms recorded for each year is diﬀerent from the number
of ﬁrms for the corresponding panel. To take an example, consider years 1990, 1991
and 1992, which compose our panel C in Table 2. The number of ﬁrms available to
analyse in this panel is 878 that is lower than that for each individual year. This is
because, for a ﬁrm to be included in the panel, we require that it survives in all the
years composing this panel. This is the case in four panels out of six.
22Table 2 also shows the results regarding our last classiﬁcation crite-
rion. More speciﬁcally, the columns denoted as DLEV and DCASH
report results on persistent deviations from optimal leverage and cash
levels respectively and DCONS reports the number of ﬁrms that devi-
ate from both targets. 144 ﬁrms display such characteristics. Note that
the number of ﬁrms (144) classiﬁed as ﬁnancially conservative using the
deviation criterion is diﬀerent from that (181) derived from our earlier
analysis of conservative ﬁrms. This raises the question as to what ex-
tent the ﬁrms classifed as conservative under each approach match. The
ﬁndings of this investigation are presented in Figure 3.
INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
The upper part of this ﬁgure, Panel A, reports the ﬁndings with
respect to the discriminant analysis for each variable without consider-
ing the deviations, which correspond to the columns LEV , CASH and
CONS in Table 2. Panel A also shows explicitly, for example, the num-
ber of ﬁrms that are leverage-conservative and not cash-conservative, and
vice versa. This is implicit in Table 2. On the other hand, the lower part
of the ﬁgure reports an inverted classiﬁcation tree relative to all panels
constructed by means of DLEV, DCASH and DCONS.S o m e o f t h e
ﬁndings derived from this investigation are interesting. For example, it
seems that all ﬁrms that are found to be persistently deviating from their
optimal leverage, DLEV, are also classiﬁed as leverage-conservative by
the discriminant analysis - see the dotted line (1). The same holds for
23the other two categories of ﬁrms, DCASH and DCONS,d e n o t e db y
the dotted lines (3) and (2) respectively. We argue that these results in
general provide support for the validity of the distributional approach.
4.2 Characteristics of conservative ﬁrms
In this section, we provide a descriptive analysis of the main character-
istics of ﬁnancially conservative ﬁrms and a comparison of these chara-
teristics with those of ﬁrms in the control group. Statistics presented
are based on the average values from the six non-overlapping three-year
panels. It shows that the mean cash ratio is 10.8 percent and the median
value is 6.9 percent. Moreover, the mean leverage is 17.9 percent and the
median value is 16.4 percent. The mean value for market-to-book is 1.62.
The percentage shares held by executive and non-executive directors are
9.1 percent and 2.7 percent respectively. The ratio of the number of non-
executive directors to the total number of directors on the board is less
than 50 percent, at 44.5 percent. The capital expenditures ratio of the
UK ﬁrms in our sample is 8 percent.
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
Table 4 reports correlations among variables. Results point out that
leverage is, as expected, negatively correlated to cash holdings. In turn,
cash holdings are positively correlated to the market-to-book ratio, sup-
porting the view that ﬁrms with greater growth opportunities tend to
hold more cash. The fraction of shares held by non-executive directors
24is positively correlated to the fraction of the shares held by executive di-
rectors. Note, however, that the shares held by the latter are negatively
correlated to the number of non-executive directors. Clearly, size of the
board is positively and highly correlated to the ﬁrm size.
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE
Table 5 reports tests for diﬀerences in mean values of the main vari-
ables used in our analysis for each group of ﬁr m sa n dt h ec o n t r o lﬁrms
in the relevant category. By construction, the mean values of cash hold-
ings and leverage for conservative ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
those for ﬁrms in the control sample. Furthermore, in line with pre-
dictions, conservative ﬁrms seem to have superior growth opportunities
than the control ﬁrms, evidenced by the signiﬁcantly higher value of the
market-to-book ratio for conservative ﬁrms. Conservative ﬁrms across all
categories are signiﬁcantly smaller than those in the control group, which
may be seen as evidence for the view that smaller ﬁrms face more severe
asymmetric information problems and hence higher costs of external ﬁ-
nance. Also consistent with the ﬁndings of prior research, conservative
ﬁrms do not spend as much on capital expenditures as control ﬁrms do.
INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE
The results in Table 5 also reveal that conservative ﬁrms and con-
trol ﬁrms have ownership structures which are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent.
25Executive directors in ﬁnancially-conservative ﬁr m sh a v eg r e a t e rs h a r e -
holdings than those in the control ﬁrms. However, the shareholdings of
non-executive directors are greater only in leverage-conservative groups
when compared with the non-executive directors’ holdings in the control
ﬁrms. These results possibly provide support for the risk-averse man-
agers who tend to have low leverage, and the free cash ﬂow hypothesis
which predicts that managers have incentives to increase the amount of
liquid funds under their control. It is also interesting to note that the
ratio of non-executive directors in conservative ﬁrms is smaller, possibly
providing executive directors with greater discretion. Furthermore, the
board size in ﬁnancially-conservative ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly smaller than
that in ﬁrms in the control group. However, there is no evidence that
shares held by large shareholders diﬀer between conservative ﬁrms and
ﬁrms in the control group.
Finally, ﬁnancially-conservative ﬁrms signiﬁcantly deviate from their
targets of leverage and cash holdings. More speciﬁcally, it seems that
conservative ﬁrms undershoot their leverage target and overshoot their
target for cash holdings.
4.3 The logistic regression results
In the following, we present the results of our logit regression analyses
regarding all three types of ﬁnancial conservatism. For comparison pur-
poses, for each type of conservatism, the results with respect to the alter-
native classiﬁcation schemes are given separately. That is, in each table,
Model A reports results based on the ﬁxed classiﬁcation rule; Model B
26reports those results based on the discriminant analysis; and, ﬁnally, the
dependent variable in Model C is based on the deﬁnition of conservatism
that accounts for persistent deviation from optimal behaviour. All three
models include time and industry dummies.
INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE
Table 6 presents the estimation results of logistic models that relate
ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics to the probability of adopting a leverage-
conservative policy. The results in most cases are consistent across the
alternative classiﬁcation schemes. In accordance with predictions, ﬁrms
that are classiﬁed as cash-conservative are also likely to adopt a leverage-
c o n s e r v a t i v ep o l i c y . T h e r ei ss t r o n ge v i d e n c et h a tl a r g e rﬁrms are less
likely to be leverage-conservative. This ﬁnding possibly provides support
for the view that larger ﬁrms ﬁnd easier to raise debt ﬁnancing as the
cost of doing so is lower for them than it is for smaller ﬁrms. If this is
the case, one could also interpret this ﬁnding as a support for the view
that smaller ﬁrms are more ﬁnancially constrained.
The results also suggest that the probability of pursuing a leverage
conservative policy is positively related to the ﬁrm’s proﬁtability and its
market-to-book ratio. The former ﬁnding is in line with the prediction of
the pecking order theory, while the latter provides support for the view
that ﬁr m sw i t hg r e a t e rg r o w t ho p po r t u n i t i e sh a v ei n c e n t i v e st oh a v es p a r e
debt capacity, i.e. the precautionary motive. The positive coeﬃcient of
the market-to-book variable is also in line with the ﬁndings of the prior
27research on capital structure, which provide strong evidence for a negative
relationship between leverage and growth opportunities (see, e.g., Barclay
et al., 2003; Rajan and Zingales, 1995; and Smith and Watts, 1992).
Corporate ownership structure seems to exert some signiﬁcant inﬂu-
ence in determining leverage-conservative policies. Shares held by non-
executive directors are signiﬁcantly and positively associated with the
probability of adopting such policy. To the extent that higher leverage in-
creases the probability of ﬁnancial distress and bankruptcy, it seems that
non-executive directors become more risk-averse with respect to leverage
decisions. Alternatively, it can be argued that the interests of executive
and non-executive directors are better aligned as their shareholdings in
the company increase. This would in turn reduce the disciplinary pres-
sure exerted on executive directors by non-executives and increase the
cost of external debt, leading to lower levels of leverage. However, the
impact of the ratio of non-executive directors on the probability of a
conservative leverage policy is negative and signiﬁcant. To the extent
that non-executive directors monitor executive directors and leverage
disciplines executive managers, this result is not surprising. That is,
it appears that non-executive directors let leverage act as a disciplining
device when their inﬂuence in the board diminishes. Another possible
explanation might be that the cost of debt ﬁnancing possibly falls as
the number of non-executives increases and hence raising debt becomes
relatively easy, leading to higher leverage.
INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE
28Table 7 reports the estimations results of the logistic regressions with
respect to the probability of adopting a cash-conservative policy. Similar
to the ﬁndings we reported earlier for leverage-conservatism, the ﬁndings
from all speciﬁcations reveal that the probability of cash-conservatism is
positively and signiﬁcantly associated with leverage-conservatism. The
leverage-conservatism among cash-conservative ﬁrms may reﬂect the pref-
erences of managers who choose to hold substantial cash balances to avoid
the use of debt ﬁnancing. In addition, the results suggest that the higher
the growth opportunities, the higher the probability that ﬁrms will ac-
cumulate cash, possibly in an attempt to avoid situations in which they
will have to give up proﬁtable investments. Not surprisingly, evidenced
by negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcient of the capital expenditures ratio,
ﬁrms with greater capital expenditures are less likely to hold substantial
cash balances.
As in the case of leverage conservatism, we ﬁnd that ownership struc-
ture matters. It is clear that holdings by executive directors positively
contributes to the probability of a conservative cash policy. This ﬁnding
provides support for our earlier argument that greater shareholdings by
executive managers make the monitoring of managers’ actions by outside
shareholders diﬃcult as a result of greater direct control over the ﬁrm.
This would, in turn, increase the ability of insiders (executive directors)
to resist outside pressures and, consequently, entrenched managers who
are relatively free of external discipline would choose to accumulate more
cash to pursue their own interests without risking replacement. We are
not able to provide any evidence in favour of the argument that man-
29agerial ownership can help align the interests of managers with those of
shareholders. If that happened, one would expect that lower expected
agency costs, due to the alignment of interests, would increase the ﬁrm’s
ability to raise external ﬁnance, which would in turn reduce ﬁrms’ in-
centives to accumulate cash, implying a negative inﬂuence exerted by
executive shareholdings on the probability of a conservative cash policy.
INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE
Finally, in Table 8 we report estimation results regarding the mod-
els which estimate the relationship between ﬁrm characteristics and the
probability of adopting a ﬁnancial conservative policy, where ﬁrms are
both cash and leverage conservative. There is strong evidence that larger
ﬁrms are less likely to have conservative ﬁnancial policies, providing sup-
port to the view that the cost of external ﬁnancing for large ﬁrms is
lower than that for smaller ﬁrms and hence they do not have incentives
to stockpile cash and have spare debt capacity. This can also be inter-
preted as support for the pecking order theory in the sense that ﬁrms
ﬁrst use internal funds available to them and then resort to external ﬁ-
nancing. It seems that precautionary behaviour is dominant for smaller
ﬁrms.
Evidence also shows that capital expenditures are negatively and sig-
niﬁcantly associated to the probability of adopting a ﬁnancially-conservative
policy. As predicted, the higher the ﬁrm’s capital expenditures with re-
spect to its total assets, the lower the likelihood that the ﬁrms will be
30ﬁnancially-conservative. Across all speciﬁcations, the market-to-book ra-
tio is positively associated with the probability of using a ﬁnancial con-
servative policy.
Last but not least, there is evidence that the fraction of shares held
by executive directors exerts inﬂuence on the probability of adopting
a conservative ﬁnancial policy. Moreover, to the extent that executive
directors receive private beneﬁts from conservative ﬁnancial policies not
shared with outside shareholders, non-executive managers seem to play a
monitoring role by preventing ﬁrms to stockpile cash and to create spare
debt capacity. All else equal, non-executive managers appear to like ﬁrms
to hold lower levels of cash and have higher levels of debt in the ﬁrm’s
capital structure.
5 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we have examined the incentives and characteristics of ﬁrms
that seem to have conservative ﬁnancial policies by using a large sam-
ple of UK ﬁrms during the period 1984 to 2001. There are important
features of our analysis, which, we believe, signiﬁcantly extend the lit-
erature on ﬁnancial conservatism. First, we combine the literature on
capital structure and leverage-conservatism with the literature on cash
holdings and cash-conservatism, which leads to an alternative view as to
what constitutes a ﬁnancially-conservative ﬁrm. Second, as opposed to
the existing studies that choose ﬁx e dt h r e s h o l dl e v e l so fc a s hh o l d i n g s
or leverage to identify ﬁnancially conservative ﬁrms, we estimate the ap-
31propriate cut-oﬀ points without imposing ap r i o r iarbitrary threshold
levels. Moreover, in order to allow these cut-oﬀ points to vary over time,
we carry out this analysis for each year throughout the sample period.
Third, distinct from previous empirical studies, we allow for the possibil-
ity that ﬁrms that seem to be ﬁnancially-conservative may also deviate
from their optimal behaviour. That is, we account for diﬀerences not only
in the observed pattern of cash holdings and leverage but also in target
levels of cash holdings and leverage across ﬁrms. Then, we study to which
extent variables proxying for the ﬁrm ownership structure - namely, the
size and the composition of the board, ownership concentration and the
fractions of shares held by executive and non-executive directors - aﬀect
the decisions of pursuing a ﬁnancially conservative behavior.
Our results suggest that ﬁrms having a ﬁnancially conservative policy
also tend to be persistently oﬀ-target with regard to cash and leverage
policies. Consistent with the prediction of the pecking order theory,
we ﬁnd that ﬁrms with greater growth opportunities persistently ex-
hibit higher cash holdings and lower levels of leverage. Moreover, we
ﬁnd that the ownership structure of ﬁr m si ss i g n i ﬁcant in determining
whether they adopt a conservative ﬁnancial policy. In particular, cash-
conservatism is positively related to the ownership concentration and to
the amount of shares held by executive directors in the board, while
leverage-conservatism is positively related to the fraction of shares held
by non-executive directors. Finally, the probability of adopting conser-
vative policies, either deﬁned by using cash holdings or leverage or both,
decreases with the number of non-executive directors.
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.Year Total MW MP MW-MP LEV CASH CONS
1984 147 30 6 5 30 11 7
1985 205 41 16 9 54 25 16
1986 246 49 24 11 61 27 13
1987 489 98 62 32 142 101 53
1988 786 153 92 48 234 129 76
1989 848 170 87 51 227 153 85
1990 882 176 97 54 134 180 72
1991 902 180 105 55 202 213 91
1992 920 184 100 52 135 129 54
1993 956 191 117 61 184 255 105
1994 1012 202 120 77 215 213 109
1995 1069 214 126 75 191 158 81
1996 1141 228 136 85 228 181 99
1997 1115 223 162 100 245 211 121
1998 1033 207 147 84 191 196 102
1999 924 185 118 64 163 145 72
2000 849 170 105 59 199 137 76
2001 793 159 106 63 128 109 58
Total 14317 2860 1726 985 2963 2573 1290
Table 1
Time Distribution of Firms According to Alternative Classification Criteria
The sample period is 1984-2001. The total number of firms over the sample period is 1196.
Column marked as Total reports the number of firm-year observations in each year. Firms are
classified as MW if their leverage belongs to the first 20% of the leverage distribution. Firms
are classified as MP if they display a cash holding-total assets ratio greater than 25%. MW-
MP are firms satisfying both MP and MW. A firm is classified as LEV if the firm leverage is
smaller than the first interior minimum of the leverage distribution. A firm is classified as
CASH if the firm cash holdings is bigger than the last interior minimum of the cash holdings-


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































All Firms-Panel Observations: 4259
Panel A reports firms grouped according to the distribution-based criterion. Panel B reports
firms grouped according to their deviations from target levels of leverage and cash holdings-total
assets ratio. A firm is classified as LEV if the firm leverage is smaller than the first interior
minimum of the leverage distribution for all years of a panel. A firm is classified as CASH if its
cash holdings are gretaer than the last interior minimum of the cash holdings distribution for all
years of a panel. A firm is classified as CONS if it satisfies both LEV and CASH. Firms are
classified as DLEV if they undershoot their target leverage for all years in a panel. Firms are
classified as DCASH if they overshoot their target cash holdings for all years in a panel. Firms
are classified as DCONS if they satisfy both DLEV and DCASH.
Comparisons of Classes of Firms Grouped According to Alternative Criteria
CASH and not LEV: 
194
DCONS: 144
DLEV and not DCASH: 
284








LEV and not CASH: 
294















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Constant 2.048 2.261 0.793
(2.20)** (2.37)** (0.83)
Cash Conservatism 2.600 2.436 1.925
(10.9)*** (11.7)*** (9.42)***
Total Assets (log) -0.481 -0.492 -0.410
(-6.50)*** (-6.44)*** (-5.41)***
Profits/Total assets 3.694 3.237 2.700
(5.88)*** (5.09)*** (4.29)***
Market-to-book 0.315 0.316 0.324
(4.81)*** (4.66)*** (4.87)***
Fixed assets/Total assets -1.298 -1.266 -1.118
(-2.80)*** (-2.60)*** (-2.29)**
Shares held by executive directors (%) -0.008 -0.009 -0.005
(-1.42) (-1.48) (-0.90)
Shares held by non-executive directors (%) 0.024 0.021 0.017
(2.47)*** (2.01)** (1.65)*
Non-executive directors in the board (%) -2.235 -2.257 -1.881
(-3.94)*** (-3.85)*** (-3.22)***
Shares held by major blockholders (>5%) -0.001 -0.001 0.001
(-0.11) (-0.184) (0.21)
Size of the board (log) 0.142 0.111 0.100
(0.449) (0.343) (0.31)
Log-likelihood -598.1 -564.2 -563.7
Pseudo-R
2 0.258 0.273 0.219
In model A the dependent variable is 1 if the firm leverage belongs to the first 20%
of the leverage distribution for three consecutive years and 0 otherwise; Cash
Conservatism is a dummy variable assuming value 1 if the firm cash holdings-total
assets ratio is bigger than 25% for three consecutive years. In model B the
dependent variable is 1 if the firm leverage is below the first interior minimum of
the leverage distribution for three consecutive years and 0 otherwise; Cash
Conservatism is a dummy variable assuming value 1 if the firm cash holdings is
above the last interior minimum of the cash holdings distribution for three
consecutive years. In model C the dependent variable is 1 if the firm leverage is
below its target leverage for three consecutive years and 0 otherwise; Cash
Conservatism is a dummy variable assuming value 1 if the firm cash holdings is
above its target level for three consecutive years. All models include time and
sectoral dummies. t-statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, * stand for
significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels respectively.
Table 6
Logit Models for Leverage ConservatismABC
Constant -3.448 -4.126 -3.629
(-2.92)*** (-4.15)*** (-3.42)***
Leverage Conservatism 2.617 2.464 1.975
(11.1)*** (12.0)*** (9.79)***
Cash Flow/Total assets -1.613 -0.958 -0.610
(-2.43)** (-1.57) (-1.05)
Total Assets (log) -0.049 0.028 -0.037
(-0.51) (0.35) (-0.48)
Capital Expenditure/Total assets -11.105 -10.232 -10.939
(-3.58)*** (-4.17)*** (-4.52)***
Market-to-book 0.410 0.398 0.419
(5.35)*** (5.82)*** (6.28)***
Dividends/Total assets 1.056 0.984 1.319
(1.82)* (1.94)* (2.54)**
Shares held by executive directors (%) 0.015 0.016 0.014
(2.08)** (2.45)** (2.31)**
Shares held by non-executive directors (%) -0.008 -0.004 -0.001
(-0.524) (-0.32) (-0.11)
Non-executive directors in the board (%) -0.276 -0.256 -0.591
(-0.361) (-0.39) (-0.93)
Shares held by major blockholders (>5%) 0.011 0.009 0.008
(1.76)* (1.65)* (1.68)*
Size of the board (log) 0.026 -0.016 -0.015
(0.06) (-0.04) (-0.04)
Log-likelihood -336.8 -455.4 -482.9
Pseudo-R
2 0.310 0.268 0.221
Table 7
Logit Models for Cash Conservatism Firms
In model A the dependent variable is 1 if the firm cash holdings-total assets ratio is
bigger than 25% for three consecutive years and 0 otherwise; Leverage
Convervatism is a dummy variable assuming value 1 if the firm leverage belongs to
the first 20% of the leverage distribution for three consecutive years. In model B the
dependent variable is 1 if the firm cash holdings is above the last interior minimum
of the cash holdings distribution for three consecutive years and 0 otherwise;
Leverage Conservatism is a dummy variable assuming value 1 if the firm leverage is
below the first interior minimum of the leverage distribution for three consecutive
years. In model C the dependent variable is 1 if the firm cash holdings is above its
target level for three consecutive years and 0 otherwise; Leverage Conservatism is a
dummy variable assuming value 1 if the firm leverage is below its target leverage
for three consecutive years. All models include time and sectoral dummies. t
statistics are reported in brackets. ***, **, * stand for significance at 1, 5, and 10
percent levels respectively.ABC
Constant 0.772 -0.083 -3.083
(0.59) (-0.07) (-2.09)**
Total Assets (log) -0.404 -0.291 -0.233
(-3.55)*** (-2.83)*** (-2.11)**
Capital Expenditure/Total assets -11.696 -11.344 -7.827
(-3.26)*** (-3.62)*** (-2.55)**
Market-to-book 0.535 0.595 0.567
(6.65)*** (7.82)*** (7.15)***
Shares held by executive directors (%) 0.005 0.012 0.015
(0.572) (1.64) (1.86)*
Shares held by non-executive directors (%) -0.006 -0.001 -0.004
(-0.32) (-0.06) (-0.21)
Non-executive directors in the board (%) -1.791 -1.851 -1.171
(-2.08)** (-2.36)** (-1.77)*
Shares held by major blockholders (>5%) 0.009 0.009 0.010
(1.15) (1.22) (1.29)
Size of the board (log) 0.093 -0.246 -0.184
(0.19) (-0.55) (-0.38)
Log-likelihood -276.8 -316.1 -278.6
Pseudo-R
2 0.198 0.201 0.169
Table 8
Logit Models for Financial Conservatism
In model A the dependent variable is 1 if the firm cash holdings-total assets ratio is
bigger than 25% and if the firm leverage belongs to the first 20% of the leverage
distribution for three consecutive years and 0 otherwise. In model B the dependent
variable is 1 if the firm cash holdings is above the last interior minimum of the cash
holdings distribution and if the firm leverage is below the first interior minimum of
the leverage distribution for three consecutive years and 0 otherwise. In model C
the dependent variable is 1 if the firm cash holdings is above its target level and if
the firm leverage is below its target leverage for three consecutive years and 0
otherwise. All models include time and sectoral dummies. t-statistics are reported
in brackets. ***, **, * stand for significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels
respectively.